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I. INTRODUCTION 
In early 2010, this author was fortunate to be presented with a 
special opportunity: the chance to join the state’s premier 
prosecution office on a special assignment to prosecute mortgage 
loan and real estate fraud.  It was both a personally gratifying and 
 
       †   University of Minnesota Law School, J.D., magna cum laude (2006).  The 
author is presently a prosecutor in the Complex Crime Unit of the Hennepin 
County Attorney’s Office.  The views expressed by this author do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office.  The author would, 
however, like to thank Hennepin County Attorney Mike Freeman for his 
continued commitment to prosecutions of financial fraud in Minnesota’s largest 
county as well as Senior Assistant Hennepin County Attorney Emery Adoradio and 
colleague Amber Brennan for their important contributions to this case.  The 
author also thanks the Minnesota Department of Commerce for their excellent 
work putting together such a complex set of facts and Detective Brandon Johnson 
for his many hours of testimony and many more hours of investigative efforts.  
Finally, no list of appreciation is complete without this author thanking his 
mentors in the art of trial lawyering, namely his father, George T. Sinas, and 
attorney Kathleen Flynn Peterson, as well as his wife, best friend, and muse, Shelly. 
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timely assignment.  The United States was in the throes of the 
Great Recession—a financial crisis that, in the words of former 
Harvard Law School Professor Elizabeth Warren, “began one lousy 
mortgage at a time.”1  Criminal prosecutors around the country 
were pursuing cases against individuals in the mortgage lending 
business whose actions helped bring about the economic 
implosion.  And locally, the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office 
was in the midst of a series of successful criminal prosecutions of 
Twin Cities mortgage brokers, realtors, and closing agents.2 
Much of the activity in mortgage fraud prosecutions, both 
nationally and locally, centered on loans from the subprime 
lending boom.  Loan products that have now become infamous—
“stated income,” “low doc,” and “no doc” loans—made credit too 
easy and attracted swarms of criminal activity.  But as the Great 
Recession took hold, the subprime lending market evaporated, 
property values plummeted, and communities became awash in 
foreclosed homes.  Criminal prosecutors working in 2010 still had a 
large backlog of cases from the real estate boom years.  But many, 
including this author, wondered, would criminals adapt to the new 
market environment, or would mortgage fraud disappear like 
subprime loans?  At the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, that 
question was answered when prosecutors were presented with a 
case known as “Mortgage Planners.” 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE MORTGAGE PLANNERS CASE 
The Mortgage Planners case was a criminal prosecution 
involving two primary defendants, a husband and wife from 
Hudson, Wisconsin, named James Ober and Wendy Ober (a.k.a 
Wendy Spinks).3  The case was named after the St. Paul-based 
mortgage brokerage firm that the Obers owned and operated, 
Mortgage Planners, Inc. 
The evidence presented demonstrated that the Obers had 
 
 1.  Elizabeth Warren, Fine Print, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/wp-srv/special/opinions/outlook/spring-cleaning/fine-print.html (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
 2.  See, e.g., State v. Pratt, No. A09-2323, 2011 WL 2175760 (Minn. Ct. App. 
June 6, 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 813 N.W.2d 868 (Minn. 2012); State v. 
Maxwell, No. A09-2018, 2011 WL 1544505 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2011); State v. 
Skaar, No. A09-1843, 2010 WL 3958431 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2010); State v. 
Rosenlund, No. A09-358, 2010 WL 771773 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2010). 
 3.  The defendants’ case numbers are Hennepin County District Court File 
Nos. 27-CR-11-18122 and 27-CR-11-18119. 
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devised a mortgage fraud scheme unlike any seen in Minnesota.  
The criminal complaint summarized the scheme as follows: 
Complainant’s investigation reveals that from 
approximately June 2009 through August 2010, 
Defendants and their co-conspirators participated in a 
complex scheme to fraudulently obtain millions of dollars 
of mortgage loan proceeds for the purchase of distressed 
residential properties throughout the Twin Cities 
metropolitan area.  Defendants’ scheme used “straw 
buyers” to purchase the distressed properties using 
mortgage loans guaranteed by the Federal Housing 
Administration (“FHA”) that Defendants originated 
through their mortgage brokerage, Mortgage Planners, 
Inc.  In order to qualify the straw buyers for the federally-
insured loans, Defendants devised a sophisticated scheme 
involving phony employers, bogus bank statements and 
paystubs, forged college transcripts, counterfeit court 
documents, and staged down payment gift funds.  
Defendants then illicitly profited from the scheme by 
recording against the properties sham junior mortgages 
that were payable to their business entities or associates.  
Defendants used the sham mortgages so that, upon the 
sale of the property, they could collect substantial 
kickbacks of loan proceeds through supposed “payoffs” of 
their sham mortgages.4 
The complaint then went on to explain the intricate details of 
the defendants’ alleged crime.  First, the complaint explained how 
the distressed real estate market created a crime of opportunity: 
Defendants’ fraud scheme exploited a number of factors 
unique to the current depressed real estate market.  First, 
Defendants targeted distressed homes that were in 
foreclosure.  Second, Defendants’ scheme focused on a 
certain subset of distressed homes—foreclosed properties 
that had been sold at sheriff’s foreclosure sales for a 
fraction of the total debt owed by the homeowner.  This 
allowed Defendants to take advantage of a technical 
provision of Minnesota real estate law.  In Minnesota, a 
home is sold at a sheriff’s foreclosure sale to the highest 
bidder, which is typically the foreclosing lender (also 
known as the mortgagee).  The sheriff’s sale price 
effectively replaces the existing mortgage on the home.  
 
 4.  Amended Complaint at 2, State v. Ober, Nos. 27-CR-11-18122, 27-CR-11-
18119 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 8, 2011).  
3
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Then, through a process known as redemption, a 
homeowner can reclaim the property by paying the 
sheriff’s sale price within approximately six months of the 
sheriff’s sale. 
       Traditionally, lenders’ bids at sheriffs’ sales were 
equal or close to the total debt owed by the homeowner.  
Following the recent real estate market crash, however, 
many lenders have bid only a fraction of the total debt 
owed.  In many cases, low bids by lenders have the effect 
of creating equity in the home—equity that equals the 
difference between the home’s market value and the 
sheriff’s sale price.  For example, suppose (1) a 
homeowner has a $200,000 mortgage on his home that 
goes into foreclosure; (2) the market value of the home at 
the time of the foreclosure is $150,000; and (3) the lender 
bids only $50,000 at the sheriff’s sale.  If the homeowner 
pays the $50,000 sheriff’s sale price (plus interest and 
fees) within the redemption period, the homeowner will 
own the home (worth $150,000) free of the previous 
mortgage.  Thus, the lender’s low bid would have the 
effect of creating $100,000 worth of equity.  As discussed 
below, Defendants not only targeted foreclosed properties 
with low sheriff’s sale prices but also devised a scheme to 
direct as personal payments to themselves nearly all of the 
equity created by those low sheriff’s sale prices. 
       The third factor of the depressed real estate market 
that Defendants exploited was homeowners’ ignorance of 
the foreclosure process.  That is, many homeowners were 
(and still are) unaware that they could redeem their 
homes by paying the sheriff’s sale price.  Rather, 
homeowners reasonably believed that they were required 
to pay off the entire debt owed in order to keep their 
homes.  In fact, until recently, Minnesota law perpetuated 
this misunderstanding by mandating disclosures to 
homeowners in foreclosure that erroneously stated that 
homeowners could redeem by paying off the total debt 
owed (as opposed to the sheriff’s sale price). 
       The final aspect of the real estate market that 
Defendants used to further their fraud scheme was the 
widespread availability of FHA-insured mortgage loans.  
Following the recent collapse of subprime lending, [the 
United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development] increased the availability of FHA-insured 
mortgage loans in an effort to help stabilize the mortgage 
4
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market.  An FHA-insured mortgage loan is funded by a 
bank or mortgage company but the risk of default is 
insured by the federal government.  FHA-insured loans 
are also unique in that they permit eligible borrowers to 
purchase a home with as little as a 3.5% down payment 
that can be in the form of a gift from the borrower’s 
family.  Unlike subprime loans, many of which required 
little or no documentation of a borrower’s 
creditworthiness, FHA-insured loans are subject to strict 
underwriting requirements and require a substantial 
amount of documentation in order to satisfy those 
requirements.5 
Second, the complaint explained how the defendants used 
loan origination fraud (i.e., fraud in obtaining mortgage loans) as 
the engine to power their scheme.6  That is, the money that the 
Obers stole came from loan proceeds that were used to purchase 
homes.  “In order to facilitate the sales, [the d]efendants used a 
group of ‘straw buyers.’”7  As the complaint described, “The straw 
buyers were individuals in whose names the homes were purchased 
but who could not, in reality, qualify for the loans for which they 
applied and largely did not intend to occupy or otherwise be 
responsible for the homes.”8  The complaint also explained how 
the defendants recruited and often paid individuals to act as the 
buyers.9  In many instances, after a home was purchased in a straw 
buyer’s name, the defendants then operated the home as a rental.10 
The complaint then described the defendants’ “vast facade of 
lies” that was used to trick lenders into believing that the 
individuals applying for loans were qualified borrowers.11  That 
facade included the creation of fictional employers and the 
submission to lenders of loan applications and other documents 
falsely stating that the borrowers worked for these employers.12  The 
names of the fictional employers included supposed health care 
companies like “Bio Medical Solutions,” restaurants such as 
“Franconello Italian Restaurant,” and construction firms like 
 
 5.  Id. at 3. 
 6.  Id. at 4–6. 
 7.  Id. at 4. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 5. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 4. 
 12.  Id. 
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“Heartland Paving.”13  The complaint described how the 
defendants listed bogus physical addresses for these employers and 
maintained separate telephone numbers for each employer.14  
Those phone numbers were then all routed to one “phone tree” 
that the defendants answered to falsely verify the borrowers’ 
employment.15 
In addition, the complaint described how the defendants 
created a host of forged documents in order to bolster the lies in 
the borrowers’ loan applications.16  The defendants submitted to 
lenders bogus paystubs and bank account statements that 
purported to show that the borrowers earned the income stated on 
their loan applications.17  In addition, the defendants’ scheme 
involved the use of forged college transcripts, including transcripts 
from local institutions like the University of Minnesota.18  The 
transcripts were used “to falsely explain the difference between the 
borrowers’ previous income and their new false income from their 
fictitious employment.”19 
Furthermore, and perhaps most shockingly, the defendants’ 
scheme used counterfeit divorce decrees that purported to be 
issued by Minnesota district courts.20  As the complaint described, 
“The counterfeit decrees were used to ‘divorce’ borrowers from 
their existing mortgage debt.  That is, the decrees included 
provisions that purportedly transferred the borrowers’ homes and 
all associated mortgage debt from the borrower to the borrower’s 
ex-spouse.”21  Some of the counterfeit divorce decrees used the 
names and signatures of actual Minnesota district court judges, 
whereas others used fictitious judges.22  Additionally, the complaint 
described the down-payment fraud component, noting first that 
“federal law permits borrowers obtaining FHA-insured loans to put 
as little as a 3.5% down payment and allows borrowers to use 
money gifted to them from family members for this purpose.”23  
The defendants fraudulently misrepresented the source of the 
 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 4–5. 
 16.  Id. at 5. 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. at 5–6.  
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down payment funds.  “That is, Defendants represented to lenders 
that the gifted down payment funds were from various relatives of 
the borrowers . . . [who, i]n reality, . . . had no relation to the 
borrowers.”24  A review of bank records demonstrated that the 
supposed gift funds actually came from accounts controlled by the 
defendants and their co-conspirators.25 
Third, the complaint described how the defendants used 
junior mortgages as vehicles for collecting illicit profits: 
Defendants used a sophisticated scheme of junior 
mortgages to direct kickbacks of loan proceeds to 
themselves.  This aspect of the fraud scheme involved the 
creation of second (and sometimes third) mortgages that 
were purportedly entered into between the sellers of the 
properties and various entities or associates of the 
Defendants.  These junior mortgages shared similar 
characteristics.  First, the junior mortgages were 
supposedly dated before the properties went into 
foreclosure but were not recorded against the properties 
until after the sheriff’s foreclosure sale.  Second, the 
mortgage amounts were very large and roughly 
represented the total amount of equity in the home that 
had been created by the low sheriff’s sale price.  Third, 
the mortgages were shams.  That is, a review of the 
mortgagee’s bank records reveals that the mortgagees 
(i.e., the entities or associates of the Defendants) never 
lent money to the homeowners. 
       Defendants used the junior mortgages to disguise 
payments to themselves.  As is customary at a real estate 
closing, the seller’s proceeds (which come from the 
buyer’s financing) are used to pay off the seller’s existing 
mortgage debt.  Thus, Defendants would time the closings 
to occur after their sham mortgages were recorded but 
before the end of the redemption period.  That way, the 
seller’s proceeds (which came from loans that Defendants 
fraudulently obtained in straw buyers’ names) paid off the 
existing sheriff’s sale price as well as the sham junior 
mortgages.  When the sellers’ proceeds were not enough 
to pay the amounts supposedly owed on the sham junior 
mortgages, the mortgagees controlled by Defendants 
would send letters to the closing agent agreeing to “short” 
payoffs.  Thus, Defendants used the sham junior 
 
 24.  Id. at 6. 
 25.  Id. 
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mortgages to cash out for themselves at the time of 
closing nearly all of the equity in the home. 
       The sham junior mortgages also acted as a failsafe way 
for the Defendants to acquire the properties for 
themselves if the transaction did not close.  Under 
Minnesota law, if the homeowner does not redeem, a 
junior creditor can redeem a foreclosed property by 
paying off the senior mortgages.  Thus, if Defendants were 
not able to structure a purchase using a straw buyer and 
fraudulently-obtained loan proceeds, Defendants’ sham 
junior mortgages gave them the ability to acquire 
properties with existing equity by simply paying off the 
sheriff’s sale price. 
       For the nine transactions described in this Complaint, 
the total amount of kickbacks paid to Defendants by way 
of the sham junior mortgages was over $840,000.  In all 
but one case, the kickback for each transaction was 
between $63,000 and $157,000.26 
Finally, although the complaint focused on the details of nine 
different transactions, it explained that the defendants’ scheme was 
much larger.  Specifically, “an internal review by [a lender-victim] 
indicated that it issued a total of nearly $10 million in FHA-insured 
mortgage loans in transactions brokered by Defendants for the 
purchase of approximately 65 properties in Minnesota.  A vast 
majority of those transactions have indicia of loan origination 
fraud . . . .”27 
As the above details describe, the majority of the transactions 
in the defendants’ fraud scheme involved the use of straw buyers.  
Yet after the initial complaint was filed, evidence developed 
showing that the defendants’ crime involved more than witting 
buyers, but also the use of stolen identities.  Specifically, in the 
months after the initial filing, law enforcement received 
information regarding a transaction concerning the stolen identity 
of a woman named “R.V.” and the purchase of a North Minneapolis 
home in her name.  That information led to an additional 
amendment of the complaint that described the theft of R.V.’s 
identity and over $125,000 in mortgage loan financing that was 
used to purchase, in her name, a property located on Morgan 
Avenue North in Minneapolis.28 
 
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id. at 2.  
 28.  Second Amended Complaint at 21–23, State v. Ober, Nos. 27-CR-11-
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As the amendment described, R.V. “previously resided in New 
Hope, Minnesota, with her husband and child before returning to 
[her native] El Salvador in March 2010.”29  R.V.’s husband told law 
enforcement that he learned of his wife’s stolen identity in the 
spring of 2011 after receiving in the mail a disconnection notice 
regarding utilities for the Morgan Avenue North property.30  R.V. 
never lived on Morgan Avenue North, and she never purchased 
nor authorized anyone to purchase that home or any home in her 
name.31  Nevertheless, according to county property records and 
mortgage loan documents, the property was sold to R.V. in June 
2010, three months after she had left the United States.32 
The sellers of the property “stated that they had no knowledge 
of any sale to R.V.”33  Rather the sellers believed that they had 
deeded the property in March or April of 2010, while the property 
was in foreclosure, to an employee of Mortgage Planners in 
exchange for approximately $1000.34  The property had been sold 
at a sheriff’s foreclosure sale, and the amount necessary to recover 
it from the bank was a fraction of the property’s value.35 
The sale of the property to R.V. was financed using an FHA-
insured loan.36  A review of the loan documents showed that the 
information provided to the lender came from the defendants.37  
The documents provided to the lender included fraudulent 
documents similar to those used in other transactions.  They 
included phony paystubs from a fake employer for whom R.V. 
never worked, a letter from a supposed gift donor who had no 
relationship with R.V., and a counterfeit divorce decree from 
Hennepin County District Court that purported to terminate the 
marriage of R.V. and her husband.38  In addition, evidence seized 
from a search of the Obers’ Wisconsin home showed their direct 
involvement in the theft of R.V.’s identity.  Specifically, on June 4, 
2010, just before the loan was funded, but months after R.V. left 
the country, Wendy Ober sent James Ober the following text 
 
18122, 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 21, 2011). 
 29.  Id. at 21.  
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 22.  
 38.  Id. 
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message: “Set up that other phone for [R.V.] and i will use that to 
talk to the lender back and forth, have peter set it up for me under 
her address in new hope.”39  In addition, documents seized at the 
Obers’ home included a U.S. Postal Service form that changed 
R.V.’s address to the Obers’ home as well as statements for credit 
cards in R.V.’s name listing the Obers’ home as the billing 
address.40 
At closing, approximately $31,500 of the sellers’ proceeds were 
disbursed to the Hennepin County Sheriff to redeem the property 
from foreclosure.41  Yet an additional almost $91,000 was paid to 
one of the Obers’ entities, “Eagle River Financial,” to pay off a 
second mortgage.42  The second mortgage in favor of Eagle River 
was purportedly signed by the sellers in October 2009 but not 
recorded until March of 2010—approximately three months after 
the property had been sold at a sheriff’s foreclosure sale.43  The 
sellers, however, stated that they never gave Eagle River Financial a 
second mortgage on the property and that they were unaware that 
money had been disbursed to that entity.44  In short, the defendants 
made approximately $91,000 by structuring the sale of a home 
from sellers who had no knowledge of what was actually occurring 
to a woman who did not live in the country. 
III. THE OFFENSE OF RACKETEERING AND ITS APPLICATION TO            
THE MORTGAGE PLANNERS CASE 
In 1989, the Minnesota legislature enacted the Racketeering 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.45  The statute, often 
referred to as “RICO” or simply “racketeering,” was modeled after 
its federal counterpart.46  To laypersons and many practitioners, 
racketeering conjures images of Mafia-style organized crime.  And 
in its first decades, Minnesota’s racketeering statute was successfully 
used in prosecutions involving “traditional” organized crime such 
 
 39.  Id. (errors in original). 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 22–23. 
 44.  Id. at 23. 
 45.  See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 609.901–.912 (2012). 
 46.  Gail A. Feichtinger, Note, RICO’s Enterprise Element: Redefining or 
Paraphrasing to Death?, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1027, 1041 n.87 (1996) (discussing 
RICO’s legislative history). 
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as narcotics trafficking47 and extortion.48  Yet despite these 
associations, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that “our 
statute is not limited to drug ‘kingpins’ or major crime 
syndicates.”49  This, of course, makes sense because the statute does 
not limit application to a certain persona of defendant. 
Rather, the essence of the offense of racketeering lies within its 
two key elements: an “enterprise” and a “pattern of criminal 
activity.”50  Although the statute sets forth three different modes of 
racketeering,51 all three reference the statute’s definitions of an 
enterprise and a pattern of criminal activity. 
An enterprise is a “sole proprietorship, partnership, 
corporation, trust, or other legal entity, or a union, governmental 
entity, association, or group of persons, associated in fact although 
not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as legitimate 
enterprises.”52  Simply put, an enterprise under the racketeering 
statute is either a formal organization or an informal group of 
associated persons.  Furthermore, a pattern of criminal activity 
includes three or more “criminal acts” that share the following 
characteristics: 
(1) were committed within ten years of the 
commencement of the criminal proceeding; 
(2) are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related 
and connected in point of time or circumstance of 
commission as to constitute a single criminal offense; and 
(3) were either: (i) related to one another through a 
common scheme or plan or a shared criminal purpose or 
(ii) committed, solicited, requested, importuned, or 
intentionally aided by persons acting with the mental 
 
 47.  See, e.g., State v. Kujak, 639 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. 2002).  
 48.  See, e.g., State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191 (Minn. 1994).  
 49.  Id. at 195.  
 50.  § 609.903, subdiv. 1. 
 51.  See id. 
 52.  Id. § 609.902, subdiv. 3.  In Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 196, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that the following three characteristics should be added to 
the definition of an enterprise:  
(1) a common purpose among the individuals associated with the 
enterprise; where (2) the organization is ongoing and continuing, with 
its members functioning under some sort of decision making 
arrangement or structure; and where (3) the activities of the 
organization extend beyond the commission of the underlying 
criminal acts either to coordinate the underlying criminal acts into a 
pattern of criminal activity or to engage in other activities. 
11
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culpability required for the commission of the criminal 
acts and associated with or in an enterprise involved in 
those activities.53 
The criminal acts (sometimes referred to as “predicate 
offenses”) that can comprise a pattern of criminal activity are 
extensive and varied.  They include violent crimes such as murder, 
manslaughter, assault, robbery, and kidnapping.54  They also 
include crimes against justice like coercion, bribery, perjury, and 
witness tampering.55  And finally, criminal acts under the 
racketeering statute include economic crimes like concealing 
criminal proceeds, theft by swindle, and identity theft.56  In this 
respect, racketeering is the zenith of Minnesota’s Criminal Code.  
Because of the wide range of crimes within the statutory definition 
of criminal acts comprising a pattern criminal activity, racketeering 
brings under one offense crimes that are otherwise unrelated.  
That is, so long as the criminal acts were committed by the 
defendant through his relationship with an enterprise, evidence of 
all such criminal acts falls within the ambit of racketeering.  
Practitioners and judges thus sometimes describe racketeering as 
an offense with its own joinder provision.57 
In addition to encompassing a wide variety of criminal 
conduct, the racketeering statute is a flexible tool because of the 
volume of criminal conduct it can include.  Although the definition 
of a pattern of criminal activity requires a minimum of three 
criminal acts, the statute does not cap the number of crimes that 
can be considered within one offense.  This makes racketeering an 
especially useful tool for prosecuting defendants who engage in 
prolific criminal behavior.  For example, absent the racketeering 
statute, a defendant who commits fifty acts of coercion might be 
charged in fifty separate cases or with fifty separate counts.  The 
racketeering statute gives the prosecutor the option of charging all 
of the conduct under one overarching charge of racketeering. 
The evidence presented regarding defendants James and 
Wendy Ober showed that their alleged crime was well suited for 
racketeering.  First, the evidence demonstrated that all of their 
 
 53.  § 609.902, subdiv. 6. 
 54.  Id. § 609.902, subdiv. 4. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id.  
 57.  For more on joinder of offenses in Minnesota, see MINN. R. CRIM. P. 
17.03. 
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criminal acts were committed through their business, Mortgage 
Planners, Inc.  That business was a Minnesota corporation and 
therefore an “enterprise” under the racketeering statute.58  Second, 
the quantity and variety of the Obers’ crimes were a match for the 
statute’s definition of a pattern of criminal activity.  The evidence 
presented showed not only that the Obers carried out scores of 
fraudulent transactions, but also that the underlying criminal acts 
included concealing criminal proceeds, theft by swindle, and 
identity theft.  As such, the Obers were charged with one count of 
racketeering in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.903, 
subdivision 1(1).  That is, they were charged to have been 
“employed by or associated with an enterprise, to wit, Mortgage 
Planners, Inc., and intentionally conducted or participated in the 
affairs of the enterprise by participating in a pattern of criminal 
activity, namely, theft by swindle, identity theft, and concealing 
criminal proceeds.”59  Simply stated, this offense required proof of 
three basic elements: (1) the existence of an enterprise, (2) the 
defendants’ association with that enterprise, and (3) a pattern of 
criminal activity. 
IV. STRAIGHT—BUT NOT NECESSARILY STRAIGHTFORWARD— 
GUILTY PLEAS 
As any practitioner or judge will attest, nearly all cases settle.  
In the few that do not, settlement is usually forced out of reach 
because of the parties’ divergent views on the defendant’s 
culpability.  It is the rarer case, however, where settlement fails even 
though the parties agree that the defendant is guilty.  But this was 
one such case. 
As the complaint demonstrated, the evidence in support of the 
State’s case was substantial and detailed.  It should come as no 
surprise then that the defendants never asserted a claim of 
innocence.  Nevertheless, the parties were unable to reach a 
settlement.  Efforts at plea bargains were unsuccessful because the 
parties had vastly different views of the appropriate sanction for the 
defendants’ crime.  As the State declared in various filings, it 
believed this to be the most egregious mortgage fraud case ever 
prosecuted by the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office60 and thus 
 
 58.  MINN. STAT. § 609.902, subdiv. 3 (2010). 
 59.  Second Amended Complaint, supra note 28, at 24. 
 60.  See, e.g., State’s Notice of Intent to Seek an Upward Sentencing 
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demanded a commensurate sentence.  Suffice to say that James and 
Wendy Ober did not agree with the State’s assessment of their 
conduct. 
Because the parties could not reach a plea bargain, the 
defendants elected to enter what is known as a “straight plea.”  
Simply put, a straight plea means that a criminal defendant enters a 
guilty plea to all counts with which he is charged without any 
agreement or promises from the court or the State.61  In most 
criminal cases, the mechanics of a straight plea are relatively 
straightforward.  That is, the defendant, after waiving his 
constitutional rights,62 enters a factual basis establishing that he did, 
in fact, commit each element of every offense charged.  The trial 
court then determines an appropriate sentence under the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. 
Yet as this case demonstrated, the offense of racketeering and 
straight pleas are strange bedfellows.  The problem lies first in the 
nature of the offense of racketeering.  As discussed above, one 
commits racketeering when one engages in a pattern of criminal 
activity that consists of at least three criminal acts that can run the 
gambit from assault to perjury.63  In other words, one associated 
with an enterprise can commit racketeering by inflicting one 
hundred brutal beatings or telling three lies in a deposition about 
those beatings.  And in a pure statutory sense, a factual basis in 
which a defendant admits to either the beatings or the lies would 
suffice for purposes of a guilty plea to the offense of racketeering. 
In this case, the alleged pattern of criminal activity did not 
stretch from assaults to perjury.  It did, however, include allegations 
of both theft by swindle64 and identity theft.65  In addition, the 
criminal complaint alleged that James and Wendy Ober committed 
dozens of fraudulent transactions.  Yet in their guilty pleas, James 
and Wendy Ober offered much narrower views of their crime.  
Most significantly, both defendants refused to admit at their guilty 
 
Departure at 2, State v. Ober, Nos. 27-CR-11-18122, 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. Dist. 
Ct. Nov. 14, 2011). 
 61.  See generally State v. Suing, No. A07-412, 2008 WL 132124, at *2 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2008) (describing a straight guilty plea as one with no 
unequivocal promise of a particular sentence).   
 62.  See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.  
 63.  See  §§ 609.902–.903. 
 64.  See § 609.52, subdiv. 2(4). 
 65.  See id. § 609.527, subdiv. 2. 
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plea that they committed identity theft involving R.V.66  Rather, the 
Obers presented factual bases that acknowledged a pattern of 
criminal activity consisting of only theft by swindle.  In addition, the 
Obers initially offered factual bases that discussed only the 
minimum three transactions.67  This presented a vexing question: 
In a case where the State alleges racketeering through an extensive 
and varied pattern of criminal acts, could the defendants enter 
guilty pleas simply by confessing to three of the least severe acts?  
And, if so, how should the case proceed from that point? 
The problem presented by this question was not simply 
theoretical.  Rather, it presented serious practical considerations 
for sentencing.  To fully appreciate why this is so, one needs some 
basic background on the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and 
how racketeering is treated under the Guidelines.  At the risk of 
oversimplification, and understanding that the Guidelines have 
been and will be subject of much authorship, the heart of the 
Guidelines is the Sentencing Grid.68  That Grid has two axes, one 
for the severity level of the defendant’s crime, and the other for the 
defendant’s criminal history score.69  The intersection of the two 
axes marks the presumptive sentence for a particular offense. 
The offense of racketeering, however, is what is known as an 
“unranked” offense.70  That is, the Guidelines assign no severity 
level to racketeering, thus giving the crime no presumptive 
sentence.  This, of course, makes sense when one considers the 
varied criminal acts that can comprise a pattern of criminal activity.  
To use the example again, racketeering committed through a 
pattern of assaults is, and should be, treated differently that 
racketeering done through multiple acts of perjury.  The 
Guidelines’ unranked treatment of racketeering thus recognizes 
the unique and flexible nature of the offense.  But in doing so, the 
Guidelines offer the trial court little guidance on how to assign a 
severity level to the offense.  The Guidelines simply direct judges to 
“exercise their discretion by assigning an appropriate severity level 
for that offense and specify on the record the reasons a particular 
 
 66.  See Transcript of Proceedings, State v. Ober, No. 27-CR-11-18122 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Apr. 12, 2012); see also Order, State v. Ober, No. 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Feb. 23, 2012); Letter from Thomas Sinas to Judge Joseph Klein, State v. 
Ober, No. 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 10, 2012).  
 67.  See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 66. 
 68.  See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4.A (2012). 
 69.  See id.  
 70.  See id. § 5. 
15
Sinas: Texts, Lies, and Identity Theft: Prosecuting Complex Financial Fr
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
 
1658 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:5 
level was assigned.”71  Thankfully, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
has set forth a framework for how a trial court should go about 
exercising that discretion.  In State v. Kenard, the court held that, 
when assigning a severity level to an unranked offense such as 
racketeering, trial courts should consider the following four factors: 
(1) the gravity of the specific conduct underlying the unranked 
offense, (2) the severity level assigned to any ranked offense whose 
elements are similar to the unranked offense, (3) the conduct of 
and severity level assigned to other offenders for the same 
unranked offense, and (4) the severity level assigned to other 
offenders who engaged in similar conduct.72 
Minnesota trial courts routinely make so-called Kenard findings 
when sentencing unranked offenses, so the need to do so was not 
unique to the case against James and Wendy Ober.  What was 
unique, however, was the posture of the case in light of the 
defendants’ straight pleas.  The Kenard factors necessarily require 
the trial court to make a series of factual findings.  Most notably, 
the first Kenard factor requires the trial court to consider the 
“gravity of the specific conduct underlying the unranked offense.”73  
In most cases, sentencing of an unranked offense occurs after a 
trial during which a lengthy record is developed concerning the 
defendant’s crime.  Thus, the trial court has plenty to reference 
when assessing the gravity of the defendant’s crime.  But in this 
case, James and Wendy Ober’s straight pleas stunted the record.  
There had been no trial.  Thus, if the defendants’ convictions were 
to be based on their guilty pleas alone, the court would have little 
record on which to rely for assessing the gravity of their crime.  And 
what little record existed consisted of only the defendants’ versions 
of their conduct. 
In addition, James and Wendy Ober’s refusal to admit at their 
guilty pleas to identity theft involving R.V. presented another 
obstacle in sentencing their crime.  This is because of the 
relationship between the offense of racketeering and the criminal 
acts that comprise the underlying pattern of criminal activity.  In 
the words of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, “Ranking 
racketeering at a higher level than the predicate offenses on which 
that charge is based has been upheld by this court.”74  In other 
 
 71.  See id. § 2.A. 
 72.  606 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. 2000). 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  State v. Rosenlund, No. A09-358, 2010 WL 771773, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 
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words, the severity level of the criminal acts that comprise the 
pattern of criminal activity generally sets the “floor” for the ranking 
of the racketeering offense.  This concept flows directly from the 
second Kenard factor that requires that the court consider the 
severity level of similar ranked offenses.75 
In this case, the dispute over the identity theft of R.V. had 
potential consequences for the defendants’ sentence.  That was 
because theft by swindle over $35,000 is a level-VI offense, whereas 
identity theft over $35,000 is a level-VIII offense.76  Thus, the 
ranking floor was potentially two severity levels higher or lower, 
depending on whether the facts supported the State’s or the 
defendants’ view of the transaction involving R.V. 
As a result of these unresolved issues, it was apparent that the 
case could not proceed directly to sentencing after the defendants’ 
guilty pleas.  Rather, the trial court would have to conduct a series 
of evidentiary hearings to resolve the outstanding factual issues 
pertaining to the racketeering offense.  As it turns out, additional 
hearings were already required because of yet another unresolved 
issue separate and apart from the racketeering offense: the 
existence of facts supporting an upward sentencing departure. 
Before the defendants’ guilty pleas, the prosecution filed its 
Notice of Intent to Seek an Upward Sentencing Departure on the 
following grounds: (1) that the crime charged was a major 
economic offense,77 (2) that defendants used the identities of 
others—including those of Minnesota district court judges—to 
commit their crime,78 (3) that defendants committed their crime as 
part of a group of three or more persons who actively participated 
in the crime,79 and (4) that defendants preyed on vulnerable 
individuals who were losing their homes and who were ignorant of 
the foreclosure process.80 
In Blakely v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held 
 
Mar. 9, 2010) (citing State v. Huynh, 504 N.W.2d 477, 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 75.  See Racketeering Sentencing Order and Memorandum at 4, State v. 
Gustafson, No. 27-CR-11-18669 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 2, 2012) (“The severity level 
assigned to the predicate criminal acts is a helpful benchmark for applying the 
second Kenard factor in the context of a racketeering conviction.”). 
 76.  See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5. 
 77.  See MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(a)(4) (2010). 
 78.  See id. § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(a)(12). 
 79.  See id. § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(a)(10). 
 80.  See generally id. § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(a)(1) (“[T]he victim was particularly 
vulnerable due to age, infirmity, or reduced physical or mental capacity, which was 
known or should have been known to the offender.”). 
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that a criminal defendant has a right to demand that the State 
prove to a jury the existence of facts supporting an upward 
departure beyond a reasonable doubt.81  James and Wendy Ober 
both waived their jury-trial Blakely rights.82  They did not, however, 
admit at their guilty pleas to the existence of facts supporting an 
upward sentencing departure.83  As such, the defendants put the 
State to its burden of proof regarding upward departure factors.  
Thus began a series of evidentiary hearings, referred to in short as 
“Kenard/Blakely” hearings, which resulted in the presentation of 
more evidence and testimony than is typically offered in many 
trials. 
V. INTO THE ABYSS: MARITAL PRIVILEGE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS 
The intricate details of the evidence presented at the 
Kenard/Blakely hearings are beyond the scope of this article.  Suffice 
to say that the State presented evidence and testimony to support 
the facts set forth in the complaint, with an eye toward how that 
evidence applied to the issues of offense ranking and aggravating 
sentencing factors.  The trial court heard testimony from witnesses 
across the factual spectrum of the case, including co-conspirators, 
borrowers who bought homes with loans brokered through 
Mortgage Planners, distressed homeowner-sellers, mortgage 
lending experts, and individuals whose identities had been 
unlawfully used.  In addition to testimony, the trial court received 
nearly one hundred exhibits that included loan files, bank records, 
and evidence obtained via search warrant. 
Yet of all the evidence in the case, none sparked more dispute 
than a series of text messages between James and Wendy Ober.  
Those text messages were obtained when law enforcement 
executed a search warrant of the Obers’ Wisconsin home, which 
resulted in the seizure of both physical and digital evidence.84  One 
such piece of digital evidence were text messages on James Ober’s 
cell phone—including text messages between him and his wife.  
One of those text messages was referenced in the criminal 
complaint as direct evidence in support of the State’s claim that the 
Obers stole R.V.’s identity.  This text, which Wendy Ober sent to 
 
 81.  542 U.S. 296, 301–05 (2004).  
 82.  Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 66, at 8. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Second Amended Complaint, supra note 28, at 4–5. 
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James Ober in the weeks before the loan in R.V.’s name was 
funded, read: “Set up that other phone for [R.V.] and i will use that 
to talk to the lender back and forth, have peter set it up for me 
under her address in new hope.”85  This text was significant because 
the evidence showed that someone posing as R.V. did, in fact, talk 
with the mortgage lender that provided the loan issued in her 
name. 
In their pretrial motions, both James and Wendy Ober sought 
to exclude all text messages between them on the grounds that the 
messages were privileged marital communications.  They relied on 
Minnesota Statutes section 595.02 that provides: 
A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife 
without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband 
without his consent, nor can either, during the marriage 
or afterwards, without the consent of the other, be 
examined as to any communication made by one to the 
other during the marriage.86 
This statute affords married couples in Minnesota two kinds of 
marital privilege: the testimonial privilege and the communications 
privilege.  The testimonial privilege “prevent[s] a spouse from 
testifying against the other during the marriage.”87  The 
communications privilege “prevent[s] a spouse from testifying at 
any time concerning confidential interspousal communications 
made during the marriage.”88 
Minnesota courts have held that the marital privilege is 
absolute and, unlike other states, have refused to recognize any 
exceptions to the privilege.89  Yet as is often true in the Upper 
Midwest, things are different on the other side of the St. Croix 
River.  That is, Wisconsin law recognizes an exception to its 
statutory marital privilege.  As the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin 
held, “The marital privilege statute does not apply to 
communications between spouses who conspire to act as agents for 
each other in an unlawful transaction.”90 
While that may be true, did it mean anything for this case?  
True, James and Wendy Ober were Wisconsin residents.  But this 
was a Minnesota state prosecution, venued in Hennepin County, 
 
 85.  Id. at 22 (errors in original). 
 86.  MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 1(a) (2010). 
 87.  State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 483 (Minn. 2005). 
 88.  Id. (citing State v. Gianakos, 644 N.W.2d 409, 415 (Minn. 2002)). 
 89.  See Gianakos, 644 N.W.2d at 409. 
 90.  State v. Doney, 338 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). 
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where all of the alleged crimes occurred in Minnesota.  And wasn’t 
this conflict of laws issue something that only matters to law 
students and civil litigators?  Turns out, the answer was a 
resounding “no.”  And the reason for that answer came from the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in the 2004 case of State v. Heaney.91 
Heaney was a watershed decision concerning conflicts of law in 
criminal cases. The facts arose out of a fatal, alcohol-related car 
accident in Houston County, Minnesota.92  Following the accident, 
the driver-defendant was transported to a hospital in La Crosse, 
Wisconsin, where doctors obtained a blood sample showing a 
blood-alcohol level of 0.144.93  Law enforcement later sought and 
obtained a subpoena from a Wisconsin court for the defendant’s 
medical records.94  The defendant was then charged in Minnesota 
with criminal vehicular operation resulting in death.95 
At an omnibus hearing, the defendant sought to exclude the 
blood-alcohol evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in 
violation of Minnesota’s physician-patient privilege statute.96  Like 
the marital communications privilege, Minnesota’s physician-
patient privilege is absolute and includes blood samples taken by 
treating physicians.97  Wisconsin’s physician-patient statute, on the 
other hand, has exceptions for evidence in homicide trials as well 
as circumstances surrounding alcohol intoxication.98  As such, there 
was a direct conflict of laws between the two states’ privileges. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court therefore needed to set forth a 
test for resolving conflicting evidentiary privileges in criminal cases.  
The court first noted that conflicts of law tests used in civil cases, 
such as lex fori (i.e., the law the forum), lex loci (i.e., the law of place 
of the seminal event), or its own “better rule of law” analysis were 
ill-suited to criminal cases.99  So following the lead of other states, 
the court adopted the test from the Restatement (Second) of the 
Conflict of Laws.100  That test set forth two prongs: 
(1)  Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of 
 
 91.  689 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 2004). 
 92.  Id. at 170. 
 93.  Id. at 171. 
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Id. at 173. 
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Id. at 174–75. 
 100.  Id. at 175–76. 
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the state which has the most significant relationship with 
the communication will be admitted, even though it 
would be privileged under the local law of the forum, 
unless the admission of such evidence would be contrary 
to the strong public policy of the forum. 
(2) Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the 
state which has the most significant relationship with the 
communication but which is not privileged under the 
local law of the forum will be admitted unless there is 
some special reason why the forum policy favoring 
admission should not be given effect.101 
The question presented under either prong, of course, is what 
state has “the most significant relationship with the 
communication.”  The court adopted the Restatement’s definition: 
“The state of ‘most significant relationship with the 
communication’ will be the state where the communication took 
place, unless there is a prior relationship between the parties.”102  
Furthermore, “[i]f there is a prior relationship between the parties, 
the state where the relationship is centered has the most significant 
relationship, unless the state where the communication took place 
has ‘substantial contacts’ with the parties and the transaction.”103 
Applying the Restatement test to the facts of Heaney, the court 
held that Wisconsin law applied and that the evidence was thus 
admissible.104  Specifically, the court found that the communication 
at issue occurred in the Wisconsin hospital where the blood sample 
was taken and that there was no prior relationship between the 
defendant and the hospital.105  As such, the court reversed the court 
of appeals and remanded for trial.106 
Heaney had direct application to the prosecution of James and 
Wendy Ober.  But unlike in Heaney, the conflict of laws regarding 
marital privilege could not be resolved by simply looking at where 
the communications (i.e., the text messages) took place.  The 
reason why was because James and Wendy Ober were married—
meaning that there was “a prior relationship” between them.  As 
such, the issue became where their marital relationship was 
 
 101.  Id. at 175 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 139 
(1971)). 
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. at 176–77. 
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Id. 
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“centered.”107  To that end, at the omnibus hearing that occurred 
before the defendants’ guilty pleas, the State presented testimony 
concerning the Obers’ marital relationship.  The evidence showed 
that the Obers had lived in Wisconsin as a married couple for years, 
that they owned a home together in Wisconsin, and that, at one 
point in time, Wendy Ober initiated a divorce proceeding in a 
Wisconsin state court.108 
So the State argued that the Obers’ marital relationship—the 
relationship that was the subject of the privilege that they sought to 
invoke—was centered in Wisconsin and that the trial court should 
apply Wisconsin marital privilege law.  The trial court agreed.109  It 
noted that Heaney controlled the issue of marital privilege.  And 
citing the evidence presented at the omnibus hearing, it held that 
the Obers’ marital relationship was centered in Wisconsin.110  It 
thus ruled that Wisconsin law applied and refused to exclude the 
text messages between the defendants.111 
VI. RANKING AND UPWARD DEPARTURES: KEEPING THE APPLES           
AWAY FROM THE ORANGES 
At the conclusion of the hearings, the trial court had two tasks 
to complete.  The first was to assign a severity-level ranking to the 
defendants’ racketeering offense.  The second was to determine 
whether the State had proven the existence of facts supporting an 
upward sentencing departure.  Completing these tasks—and doing 
so the right way—required a careful and measured approach. 
A threshold question was whether a trial court was, in fact, 
permitted to impose an aggravated sentence with an unranked 
offense.  Or was there a constitutional problem with a court first 
exercising its discretion to assign a severity-level ranking and then 
again exercising its discretion to depart from the presumptive 
sentence for that ranking?  Like so much jurisprudential drama, 
the answer to this question was in a footnote.  In Kenard, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court said, “Once the sentencing court has 
determined the severity level by considering the conduct 
underlying proof of the elements of the offense, it is not 
 
 107.  Id. at 175. 
 108.  See Order at 4–6, State v. Ober, No. 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 
17, 2012). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Id. 
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prohibited, in appropriate cases, from considering whether there 
are also aggravating or mitigating circumstances that would justify 
departure.”112 
Although the Kenard court held that unranked offenses and 
upward departures can coexist, it did not give trial courts guidance 
on how to manage that coexistence.  Subsequent appellate 
decisions, however, did issue warnings against double-counting a 
defendant’s conduct.  That is, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
stated that “the same conduct or circumstance may not be used 
both to assign a severity level and to support an upward departure 
as an aggravating factor.”113 
So, in essence, the trial court in this case needed to separate 
into two silos evidence used to determine the ranking of the Obers’ 
offense and evidence pertaining to aggravating factors.  This 
turned out to be relatively easy to do with respect to most of the 
Kenard analysis.  That is because at least two of the factors—the 
conduct of and severity level assigned to other offenders for the 
same unranked offense and the severity level assigned to other 
offenders who engaged in similar conduct114—call for comparisons 
to other cases. 
A more delicate dance arose between the first Kenard factor—
the gravity of the specific conduct underlying the Obers’ offense—
and the fact that the State was seeking an upward departure on the 
grounds that the crime was a major economic offense.  Under 
Minnesota law, a crime is a major economic offense when it has at 
least two of the following characteristics: 
(i) the offense involved multiple victims or multiple 
incidents per victim; 
(ii) the offense involved an attempted or actual monetary 
loss substantially greater than the usual offense or 
substantially greater than the minimum loss specified in 
the statutes; 
(iii) the offense involved a high degree of sophistication 
or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time; 
(iv) the offender used the offender’s position or status to 
facilitate the commission of the offense, including 
positions of trust, confidence, or fiduciary relationships; 
 
 112.  State v. Kenard, 606 N.W.2d 440, 443 n.3 (Minn. 2000). 
 113.  Cobbins v. State, No. A07-1671, 2008 WL 4470905, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Oct. 7, 2008). 
 114.  Kenard, 606 N.W.2d at 443. 
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or 
(v) the offender had been involved in other conduct 
similar to the current offense as evidenced by the findings 
of civil or administrative law proceedings or the 
imposition of professional sanctions.115 
Early in the case, the State indicated its intent to seek an 
upward departure on major-economic-offense grounds based on 
subparts (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) of section 244.10, subdivision 
5a(a)(4).116  Yet as the sentencing phase unfolded, there appeared 
to be no meaningful way to separate the evidence relating to 
subparts (i) and (iii) from evidence related to the first Kenard 
factor.  That is, as the State acknowledged in its memorandum of 
law, “because of the incredible depth and breadth of Defendants’ 
fraud scheme . . . there is no practical way to evaluate the gravity of 
Defendants’ conduct without looking at the sophistication and 
planning that went into their scheme as well as the number of 
incidents of mortgage fraud committed by each Defendant.”117  The 
trial court agreed.  So in its initial order regarding ranking of the 
defendants’ offense, the court was careful to limit the scope of 
evidence it evaluated.  As the court stated: 
[F]or purposes of evaluating the gravity of Defendants’ 
conduct, the Court will look at the following: the scope of 
their fraud; the sophistication used to accomplish it, both 
in terms of originating mortgage loans and the means of 
directing kickbacks; the market environment in which 
Defendants’ perpetuated their fraud; and Defendants’ 
roles in the corrupt enterprise that was [Mortgage 
Planners].118 
This analysis, however, did not prevent the State from seeking 
an aggravated sentence on major-economic-offense grounds.  That 
is because the State reserved its right to seek an upward departure 
based on the remaining two subparts of section 244.10, subdivision 
5a(a)(4) (i.e., that the offense involved a monetary loss 
substantially greater than the minimum loss specified in statute and 
 
 115.  MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(a)(4) (2010). 
 116.  See State’s Notice of Intent to Seek an Upward Sentencing Departure, 
supra note 60. 
 117.  State’s Memorandum of Law Regarding Ranking of Racketeering 
Offense at 26–27, State v. Ober, Nos. 27-CR-11-18122, 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. Dist. 
Ct. May 17, 2012).  
 118.  Order and Memorandum of Law at 7, State v. Ober, Nos. 27-CR-11-
18122, 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 9, 2012). 
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that the defendants used their position or status to facilitate the 
offense).119 
On August 9, 2012, the trial court completed its first task by 
issuing an order ranking the defendants’ racketeering offense.120  
The court first observed the seriousness of the offense: 
“Racketeering is regarded as one of the most serious criminal 
offenses in Minnesota.  It is an economic crime placed alongside 
some of the most violent crimes . . . .”121  The court then analyzed 
each of the Kenard factors as they pertained to this case. 
In evaluating the gravity of the Obers’ crime (i.e., the first 
Kenard factor), the court called it “unique and extraordinary.”122  It 
noted that the evidence presented showed that James and Wendy 
Ober each originated over thirty-five fraudulent mortgage loans, 
totaling over five million dollars in theft.123  The court also 
described how the Obers “deftly” adapted to the post-subprime 
mortgage lending environment in order to commit their crime.124  
And it listed the tools that they used to make that adaptation: fake 
employers, fabricated paystubs, forged bank statements, and forged 
college transcripts.125  The court specifically quoted the testimony 
of a senior mortgage lending expert who stated, “In this particular 
case, almost every single document within the loan file was found 
to be fraudulent or altered in some manner.”126  The court also 
described the junior mortgages that the defendants used to collect 
their kickbacks as a scheme that required “a perversion of insider 
knowledge.”127 
In examining the second Kenard factor (i.e., the severity level 
assigned to a ranked offense with similar elements), the court 
settled the outstanding factual dispute regarding the identity theft 
of R.V.  The court found that the State had proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that James and Wendy Ober were criminally 
liable for the theft of R.V.’s identity in connection with the 
purchase of the North Minneapolis home.128  In doing so, the court 
 
 119.  § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(a)(4)(ii), 5a(a)(4)(iv). 
 120.  Order and Memorandum of Law, supra note 118. 
 121.  Id. at 3.  
 122.  Id. at 7. 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id. at 9. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id.  
 127.  Id. at 11.  
 128.  Id. at 13–17. 
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cited to various pieces of evidence and testimony, including the 
text messages between the Obers.129  The court also described the 
defendants’ attempt to refute the State’s proof as “simply not 
credible.”130 
Finally, in examining the third and fourth Kenard factors, the 
trial court noted that it had ample precedent from other mortgage-
fraud racketeering cases prosecuted in Minnesota on which to 
rely.131  In all of those cases, the trial courts ranked the defendants’ 
racketeering offense at severity level IX or X.132  Although 
acknowledging that precedent supported the argument, the court 
declined the State’s request to rank the offense at a level X.133  
Instead, the court elected to rank the Obers’ offense at a level IX.134  
The court, however, added the following caveat in the conclusion 
of its order: 
This is not to excuse any of the conduct by either 
Defendant in this case.  The evidence has demonstrated 
to this court that Defendants committed a menacing and 
widespread scheme that knew few boundaries.  
Defendants used a considerable array of tools at their 
disposal to defraud lenders, rob distressed homeowners of 
the equity in their homes, and steal the identity of an 
innocent person.135 
Under the court’s level-IX ranking, the presumptive sentence 
for both James and Wendy Ober (each of whom had zero criminal 
history points) was between 74 and 103 months imprisonment.136  
That presumption, however, did not determine the ultimate 
sentence.  The court still had to complete its second and final task 
of deciding whether the record established the existence of facts 
supporting an upward (or, as the defendants requested, a 
downward) departure.  The court completed this final task on 
September 13, 2012, when it held a sentencing hearing and issued 
its sentencing order.137 
In its sentencing order, the court found that the State had 
 
 129.  Id. at 14–16. 
 130.  Id. at 17. 
 131.  Id. at 18. 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id. at 22. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id.  
 136.  See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4 (2010). 
 137.  Sentencing Order, State v. Ober, Nos. 27-CR-11-18122, 27-CR-11-18119 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 13, 2012). 
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt four separate bases for an 
upward sentencing departure.  First, the court found that both 
James and Wendy Ober committed their crime as part of a group of 
three or more people who actively participated in the crime.138 
Second, the court found that the defendants used the 
identities of others without authorization to commit their crime.139  
This finding was not to be confused with the court’s earlier finding 
that the Obers committed identity theft involving victim R.V.  
Rather, this finding related to the use of counterfeit divorcees in 
the defendants’ fraud scheme.  As described above, the Obers used 
those decrees to make it appear as though the borrower in whose 
name a house was purchased (who, in reality, already owned 
another home) was debt free by way of a (fictitious) divorce in 
which the nonborrowing spouse received the home and its 
associated debt.  The court found that this aspect of the Obers’ 
crime used the identities of the real attorneys, judges, and court 
staff, whose names and signatures were on the counterfeit decrees. 
Third, the trial court found that the defendants’ crime was a 
major economic offense.140  This finding was based first on the 
court’s conclusions that the underlying criminal acts involved a 
monetary loss substantially greater than the minimum loss set forth 
by statute.141  In other words, the court concluded that many of the 
transactions in the case involved losses greater than the $35,000 
statutory amount of the predicate offense of theft by swindle.  The 
court also concluded that the defendants used their positions and 
status to facilitate the offense, citing the Obers’ abuse of trust of 
both the lenders with whom they did business and the individual 
borrowers who were conned into participating in the scheme.142 
Finally, the court found a fourth basis upon which to justify an 
upward departure.  As the court described it, the Obers’ crime 
“targeted a vulnerable group of individuals who were losing their 
homes and who were largely ignorant of the foreclosure process.”143  
This basis focused on another group of victims in the case—the 
distressed homeowners who sold their homes without knowing that 
 
 138.  Id. at 5–7; see MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(10) (2010). 
 139.  Order and Memorandum of Law, supra note 118, at 7–8; see § 244.10, 
subdiv. 5a(12). 
 140.  Order and Memorandum of Law, supra note 118, at 10–15; see § 244.10, 
subdiv. 5a(4). 
 141.  Order and Memorandum of Law, supra note 118, at 10–12. 
 142.  Id. at 12–15. 
 143.  Id. at 15.  
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the defendants’ scheme robbed them of substantial equity. 
After then concluding that the defendants failed to show the 
existence of any substantial grounds that excused or mitigated their 
culpability,144 the trial court pronounced its sentence: 120 months 
imprisonment, approximately $500,000 in restitution, and a 
$50,000 fine.145 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The evidence in the case against James and Wendy Ober might 
best be summed up in the annals of alternative music: “good news 
for people who love bad news.”146  That is, the defendants’ crime 
showed that the Great Recession did not eradicate mortgage and 
real estate fraud and that complex financial crime is still alive and 
well in Minnesota.  But the prosecution of the case did have some 
genuinely good news.  It demonstrated that, although criminals will 
continue to adapt to a changing world, Minnesota’s racketeering 




 144.  Id. at 16–20. 
 145.  Id. at 2–3. 
 146.  MODEST MOUSE, GOOD NEWS FOR PEOPLE WHO LOVE BAD NEWS (Sony 
Music Entertainment, Inc. 2004). 
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